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Abstract
This study examines biases in stock prices and financial analysts’ earnings
forecasts. These biases take the form of systematic overweighting or
underweighting of the persistence characteristics of cash versus accrual
earnings components. Our evidence suggests that stock prices tend to
overweight and financial analysts tend to underweight these persistence
characteristics. Furthermore, we find that analysts’ underweighting attenuates
stock price overweighting. However, we find little evidence that the over-
weighting in stock prices attenuates analyst underweighting. This study brings
a new perspective to the literature regarding the disciplining role of financial
analysts in capital markets.
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1. Introduction
This study investigates the role of financial analysts in stock market efficiency
with respect to earnings information derived from corporate annual reports to
shareholders.1 Sloan (1996) finds that the market overweights (underweights) the
persistence characteristics of accrual (cash flow) components of earnings, where
persistence is estimatedwith reference to the coefficient relating each current-year
earnings component to the whole of next year’s net operating income.2
Mashruwala et al. (2006) report that the cash-flow and accrual anomalies are
concentrated in stocks with low trading volume and other characteristics
associated with high arbitrage costs. As stocks covered by financial analysts tend
to have relatively high trading volume (Alford and Berger, 1999; Frankel et al.,
2006), we consider it unlikely that financial analyst activity drives the anomalous
stock price behaviour discovered by Sloan. Our study focuses on whether
financial analysts play a role inmitigating the accrual anomaly in the stocks they
follow.
Ahmed et al. (2006) also study analyst behaviour in relation to the accrual
and cash-flow anomalies. That study disaggregates total earnings into
operating cash flow, long-term accruals and current accruals. The study finds
strong evidence of consensus analyst forecast underweighting of persistence of
operating cash flows and long-term accruals, and moderate overweighting of
the persistence of current accruals; that is, the results suggest that the
underweighting of persistence characteristics of long-term accruals (operating
cash flow) is about 2.8 (2.9) times the overweighting of the persistence of
current accruals. The net underweighting of the persistence of total accruals is
statistically significant. Our study investigates whether the analyst underweigh-
ting of total accruals persistence observed by Ahmed et al. (2006) mitigates
market overweighting of accruals persistence observed by Sloan (1996) and
many subsequent studies.3 We also investigate whether analyst underweighting
offsets what otherwise might be market overweighting of the persistence of the
cash component of annual earnings.
1 See Schipper (1991), Brown (1993) and Ramnath et al. (2008a,b) for extensive reviews
of the literature investigating the role of financial analysts in capital markets.
2 See Collins and Hribar (2000) for a similar result in the context of quarterly accrual
and cash earnings.
3 Like Ahmed et al. (2006), Drake and Myers (2011) find that analysts overweight the
persistence of current accruals. Drake and Myers proceed with an investigation of
whether differences in this overweighting across individual analysts depend on analyst
characteristics such as experience, access to resources and portfolio complexity. Drake
and Myers do not assess analyst reaction to total accruals or to the components studied
in our study. Our study differs from Drake and Myers in other important ways discussed
in Section 5.
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Prior research provides evidence that stock prices respond, at least partially,
to analysts’ earnings forecast revisions (Gleason and Lee, 2003), and analysts
respond, at least partially, to information in stock returns (Clement et al.,
2011). As a result, returns on equity securities exhibit a strong contempora-
neous relation with analysts’ annual earnings forecast errors (Elgers and
Murray, 1992; So, 2013). Our study controls for this relation and investigates
how, without the influence of biased stock prices (analysts’ forecasts), analysts’
forecasts (stock prices) would respond to the persistence characteristics of free
cash-flow and accrual earnings components derived from corporate annual
reports.
Our disaggregation of annual net operating income into free cash-flow and
accrual components follows Dechow et al. (2008) (hereafter DRS). We also
apply the DRS technology in further disaggregating free cash flow into
components that reflect how firms distribute (fund) the year’s free cash-flow
surplus (deficit). The firm can hold surplus free cash flow in the form of
financial assets (i.e. cash) or distribute the surplus to investors (i.e. debtholders
and stockholders).4 On the other hand, the firm can fund a free cash-flow deficit
by reducing the firm’s cash balance or by obtaining additional capital from
debtholders and stockholders. Thus, we disaggregate free cash flow into its
change in cash, net distributions to stockholders and net distributions to
debtholders components.
We follow Richardson et al. (2001, 2006) in disaggregating accruals into sales
growth and change in asset turnover (i.e. asset efficiency) components. Accruals
(defined as changes in net operating assets) increase with increases in sales and,
for a given level of sales, with decreases in asset efficiency, where asset efficiency
equals sales divided by net operating assets.
We assess analyst and market efficiency with respect to persistence charac-
teristics of net operating income as a whole and then disaggregated into the
following: (i) free cash flow and accruals; (ii) free cash flow, sales growth and
changes in asset efficiency; and (iii) accruals, changes in cash, net distributions
to stockholders, and net distributions to debtholders. We assess analyst
efficiency with and without controls for the influence of biases in stock returns,
and we assess market efficiency with and without controls for the influence of
biases in analysts’ earnings forecasts.
In our sample of relatively large firms followed by analysts, we begin by
estimating the persistence of annual net operating income and its components.
Consistent with prior literature, we estimate that the persistence of the free
cash-flow component of net operating income exceeds the persistence of the
accrual component by 23%, a difference that is economically and statistically
significant. As expected, the sales growth component of accruals has signifi-
cantly greater persistence than the change in efficiency component. All three
components of free cash flow are highly persistent and, interestingly, the change
4 Throughout the study, we simply refer to financial assets as cash.
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in cash variable has greater persistence than the net distributions to debtholder
and stockholder variables.
To assess the bias in the stock price response to net operating income and its
components, we regress returns for year t + 1 on the year t income variables
described above. The return accumulation period extends for a full year
beginning with the fifth month following the end of fiscal year t. To assess the
bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts, we estimate a regression of the year t + 1
earnings forecast error on the year t income variables.
The key results are summarised as follows. First, removing the influence of
the bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts, we find substantial evidence of market
overweighting of the persistence of year t operating income and its components.
The evidence suggests that, without the influence of analysts’ biased response to
year t earnings information, the stock market would overweight the persistence
characteristics of the following: net operating income as a whole; the free cash-
flow and accrual components of net operating income; the sales growth and
changes in asset efficiency components of accruals; and the change in cash and
net distributions to debtholders components of free cash flow.
Second, by incorporating the influence of the bias in analysts’ earnings
forecasts, we find significant reduction of the market overweighting of the
persistence of operating income and all components of cash and accrual
earnings. Thus, biased analysts’ earnings forecasts have the effect of mitigating
market inefficiency.
Third, removing any influence of biased stock price response to year t
earnings information, we find that analysts’ year t + 1 earnings forecasts
exhibit significant underweighting of the persistence of year t net operating
income and each of its cash and accrual components. Without removing any
influence of biased stock price response, the only economically and statistically
significant change is that we find no evidence of analyst underweighting of the
persistence of the change in efficiency component of accruals. Thus, biased
stock prices generally do not attenuate analyst underweighting of the
implications of current earnings and its components for predictions of next
year’s earnings.
Overall, we conclude that, left to their own devices, analysts would generally
underweight and stock prices would generally overweight the persistence
characteristics of annual net operating income and its components. The general
underweighting in analysts’ earnings forecasts serves to attenuate the natural
tendency of investors to overweight, and stock prices become more efficient.
Mitigation of biased reaction to the persistence characteristics of earnings
information is generally a one-way street, with analyst underweighting
mitigating investor overweighting, and with market overweighting having
virtually no effect on analyst underweighting.
This study makes important contributions to the literature. First, we bring a
new perspective to the literature regarding the role of financial analysts in
capital markets. Beginning with Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), many studies
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examine the role of financial analysts in relation to anomalous stock market
behaviour. However, these studies invariably look to analysts for root causes of
market inefficiency. Instead, we find that analysts play a disciplining role that
reins in the tendency for investors and stock prices to overweight information
about future earnings. Thus, the economic incentives leading to analyst
underweighting could include an incentive to put the brakes on what otherwise
would appear as generalised market overweighting of information about future
earnings. Such an incentive could, for example, emerge from the degree to
which analyst reputation and compensation depends on the profitability of
trading strategies based on their forecasts and recommendations (Brown et al.,
2015). Opposite-direction (same-direction) subsequent surprises generally
follow overweighting (underweighting), and opposite-direction (same-direc-
tion) subsequent surprises are associated with losses (profits) to trading
positions based on previous information (Raedy et al., 2006). We leave further
investigation of such incentives for future research. Second, we draw attention
to a technique that researchers can use to investigate the interaction of analyst
and market inefficiency in other contexts.
The rest of this study is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the most
relevant literature. Section 3 provides a detailed description of our research
design. Section 4 describes our sample, Section 5 presents our results, and
Section 6 summarises and concludes the study.
2. Prior research
Beginning with Sloan (1996), researchers have investigated stock market
efficiency with respect to information in accrual and cash-flow components of
earnings. While Sloan examines the market’s response to operating cash flows
and working capital accruals minus depreciation, the research has evolved to
consider the market response to total accruals, accruals disaggregated into
various components, and free cash flows disaggregated into retained and
distributed components.
Richardson et al. (2005) find that the market overweights the persistence of
both current (non-cash working capital) and non-current operating accruals
and that trading strategies based on total operating accruals generate more
profits than strategies based on current operating accruals. Richardson et al.
(2001, 2006) disaggregate total operating accruals into sales growth and asset
efficiency (i.e. turnover) components. Richardson et al. (2001) find that the
market overweights the persistence of both the sales growth and change in asset
efficiency components of total accruals. The authors interpret this result to
support both (i) the perspective of Fairfield et al. (2003), Cooper et al. (2005),
and others that the accrual anomaly emerges from diminishing returns on
firms’ growth opportunities, and (ii) the perspective of Sloan (1996), Xie (2001),
and others that the accrual anomaly emerges from accounting distortions. We
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extend this research by examining the role of financial analysts in the
interpretation of information in components of free cash flows and accruals.
DRS demonstrate that the persistence of the free cash-flow component of
accounting earnings depends on how the firm distributes (funds) free cash-flow
surpluses (deficits). DRS find no evidence of market inefficiency with respect to
the persistence of the portion of free cash flow that the firm distributes to (or
obtains from) investors, whereas the market overweights the persistence of the
portion of cash earnings that the firm retains (uses). This contradicts prior
research evidence that the market underweights the persistence of total cash
earnings (Sloan, 1996; Desai et al., 2004; Ahmed et al., 2006).5 In a sample of
larger firms followed by analysts during a more recent time period, we re-
examine the market’s response to cash components of earnings and extend the
literature by examining the role of analysts’ forecasting behaviour in market
efficiency.
Many research studies investigate the role of financial analysts in making the
market inefficient. For example, Shane and Brous (2001) provide evidence
attributing post-earnings and post-forecast revision drift to biases in analysts’
quarterly earnings forecasts. La Porta (1996) and Doukas et al. (2002) suggest
that analysts play a role in the value/glamour stocks anomaly. Dechow and
Sloan (1997) suggest that analyst optimism influences market optimism with
respect to firms’ long-term growth prospects. Rajan and Servaes (1997),
Dechow et al. (1999), Teoh and Wong (2002), and Purnanandam and
Swaminathan (2004) provide evidence indicating that optimistic analyst
earnings forecasts contribute to the long-run underperformance of IPOs and
SEOs. Billings and Morton (2001) suggest that analyst forecasting biases
contribute to the book-to-market anomaly. Bradshaw and Sloan (2002)
attribute increasing manager and investor focus on upwardly biased ‘street
earnings’ to financial analyst forecasting behaviour. Ikenberry and Ramnath
(2002) suggest analyst responsibility for market underweighting of the
signalling information in stock splits. Elgers et al. (2003) find a role for
analysts in market overweighting the persistence of working capital accruals.
Kadiyala and Rau (2004) find an association between analyst and investor
underweighting of the future earnings implications of corporate events such as
mergers and stock repurchases. Hribar and McInnis (2012) suggest that
analysts influence investor sentiment. So (2013) develops a profitable trading
strategy based on predictable financial analyst forecasting errors and, finally,
Jackson and Johnson (2006) suggest that analyst forecasting biases play a role
in anomalous returns momentum.
Some studies refer to market underweighting information in news and events
and investigate the role of financial analysts in speeding up the market’s
5 Also see Chen and Shane (2014) who find that the market overweights the persistence
of suboptimal decreases in cash and underweights the net distribution to stockholder
component of free cash flow.
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assimilation of that information (e.g. Gurun et al. (2011) in the context of debt
markets; and Hong et al. (2000) in the context of equity markets). Barth and
Hutton (2004) suggest that analysts play a role in accelerating the market’s
correction of its overweighting of the accrual component of earnings, but they
find that the market largely ignores adjustments in analysts’ forecasts for the
temporary nature of certain extreme accruals. Our study is the first to
investigate whether the well-known restraint in analysts’ earnings forecasts
reins in what otherwise would be market overweighting the implications of
current earnings (and its components) for predictions of future earnings, and
we have a unique approach for doing so (described in Section 3 below).
3. Research design
3.1. Earnings components
Consistent with Dechow et al. (2008), we disaggregate earnings into free
cash-flow (cash) and accrual components as follows (firm subscripts suppressed
throughout all models). The balance sheet equation implies:
DAt ¼ DLt þ DSEt; ð1Þ
where t identifies the firm’s fiscal year, At = total assets, Lt = total liabilities,
and SEt = total stockholders’ equity.
6 Then, separating financing from
operating activities yields:
DOAt þ DCASHt ¼ DOLt þ DFLt þ DPSEt þ DCSEt; ð2Þ
where OAt = operating assets, CASHt = all financial assets, OLt = operating
liabilities, FLt = financial liabilities, PSEt = preferred stockholders’ equity, and
CSEt = common stockholders’ equity. Rearranging terms:
DNOAt ¼ DDEBTt  DCASHt þ DCSEt; ð3Þ
where NOAt = OAt  OLt = net operating assets, and DEBTt = all non-
owner financing, including financial liabilities, minority interest, and preferred
stockholders’ equity.
Assume clean surplus:
DCSEt ¼ NIt DIST EQt; ð4Þ
where NIt = comprehensive income, and DIST_EQt = net distributions to
common stockholders. DIST_EQt represents distributions to common stock-
6 The Appendix provides detailed definitions of each variable used in the study, along
with Compustat labels.
© 2015 AFAANZ
D. Hollie et al./Accounting and Finance 57 (2017) 199–237 205
holders by way of dividends and stock repurchases net of new owner
investment. Substituting the right-hand side of (4) for DCSEt in (3),
decomposing NIt into net operating income (NOIt) and net financing expense
(NFEt), defining DIST_Dt (net distributions to non-owner providers of
financing) as NFEt  DDEBTt and rearranging terms yield:
NOIt  DNOAt ¼ DCASHt þDIST Dt þDIST EQt: ð5Þ
Thus, free cash flowgeneratedbyoperations is represented on the left-hand side
of(5)asnetoperating incomeless thechange innetoperatingassets,andusesoffree
cash floware represented on the right-hand side of (5) as the change in cash (build-
up of the investment in financial assets) plus distributions to non-owner
contributors of financing plus distributions to owners. All terms in (5) can be
negative or positive; for example, when NOIt  DNOAt < 0, free cash flow is
used in operations and the right-hand side of (5) must also be negative indicating
thesourcesofthefreecashflowusedinoperations(netdecreases inthecashbalance
and/ornetnewinvestmentbynon-ownerandownerprovidersofcapital).Defining
DNOAtasaccruals (ACCt)andDCASHt + DIST_Dt + DIST_EQtas free cash
flow (FCFt) yields
NOIt ¼ FCFt þ ACCt: ð6Þ
Thus, net operating income equals free cash flow (i.e. cash earnings) plus
accruals (i.e. accrual earnings). Finally, deflate all terms by NOAt  1 and
define NOIt/NOAt  1 as RNOAt.
RNOAt ¼ FCFt þ ACCt; ð7Þ
where RNOAt = NOIt/NOAt – 1 = return on net operating assets, FCFt = free
cash flow deflated by lagged net operating assets, and ACCt = DNOAt deflated
by lagged net operating assets.7,8
Following Richardson et al. (2001, 2006), we define and disaggregate total
operating accruals as follows:
ACCt ¼ SGt þ ðDEFFtÞ þ SGt  ðDEFFtÞ; ð8Þ
where SGt = DSalest/Salest  1 and represents sales growth; DEFFt = DATt/
ATt and represents the change in asset efficiency measured as (Salest/
NOAt  Salest  1/NOAt  1)/(Salest/NOAt), where ATt (=Salest/NOAt)
7 Theoretically, the numerator in RNOAt should be NOIt (i.e., net operating income
after tax). Following Richardson et al. (2005, 2006), we simply represent the numerator
of RNOAt as income after depreciation (OIADP).
8 Theoretically, distributions to preferred stockholders should be included in DIST_D.
Following Dechow et al. (2008), we include distributions to/from preferred stockholders
in DIST_EQ.
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provides an indication of asset turnover or asset efficiency. Richardson et al.
(2006) provide an algebraic proof showing that the three terms on the RHS of
(8) sum to total accruals (ACCt). The authors argue that this decomposition
allows tests with the potential to distinguish between two competing
explanations for the accrual anomaly: (i) market failure to fully impound
mean reversion in sales growth (i.e. overweighting persistence of sales growth)
versus (ii) market failure to fully impound information in accruals about
temporary accounting distortions. Holding sales constant, the market might
fail to impound the temporary nature of the portion of changes in NOA due
to accounting distortions. If diminishing marginal returns on investment drive
lower persistence of accruals, this should be reflected in the growth
component of ACCt [i.e. SGt in Eqn (8)]. In contrast, if accounting distortion
or declining operating asset efficiency drives lower persistence of accruals,
then this should be reflected in the efficiency component of ACCt (i.e.
DEFFt in Eqn (8)).9
Summarising (5), (7) and (8) above, our fully disaggregated model of net
operating income becomes:
RNOAt ¼ ðDCASHt þDIST Dt þDIST EQtÞ þ ½SGt þ ðDEFFtÞ
þ SGt  ðDEFFtÞ; ð9Þ
where the first bracketed term on the RHS of (9) disaggregates free cash flow
(FCFt), and the second bracketed term disaggregates accruals (ACCt).
3.2. Earnings persistence
Replacing RNOAt in model (9) with RNOAt+1, regression model (10)
examines the persistence of net operating income and the components defined
above.
RNOAtþ1 ¼ a0 þ
Xn
i¼1
aiCit þ etþ1; ð10Þ
where Cit represents component i of RNOAt and ai represents the persistence
of component i with reference to RNOAt+1. That is, ai indicates the degree to
which the impact of Cit on RNOAt persists in terms of its relation to
RNOAt+1. We estimate four versions of the persistence model (10). In the
first version, n = 1 and C1t = RNOAt. The second version disaggregates
9 Results in Hribar and Yehuda (2008) suggest that market overweighing persistence of
firms’ growth opportunities, rather than overweighing persistence of accounting
accruals, drives the accrual anomaly, particularly for growth firms early in their life
cycle. If this is the case, then we expect that the sales growth component of Eqn (8)
should drive any market overweighing of accruals.
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RNOAt into its two broad components, FCFt and ACCt, that is n = 2,
C1t = FCFt and C2t = ACCt. The third version follows Dechow et al. (2008)
and disaggregates FCFt into DCASHt + DIST_Dt + DIST_EQt, and the
fourth version follows Richardson et al. (2001, 2006) and disaggregates ACCt
into SGt + (DEFFt) + SGt*(DEFFt). Disaggregated forms of (10) allow
the components of RNOAt to have persistence coefficients that differ from
each other. The residual, et+1, represents the portion of RNOAt+1 that is not
explained by the persistence of the components of RNOAt on the right-hand
side of (10).
3.3. Market efficiency
Figure 1describesourapproachtoevaluatingthebiases (ifany)ofmarketprices
andanalysts’ forecastswithrespect tothepersistencecharacteristicsofRNOAtand
its components, FCFt and ACCt. If the stock price, PB, efficiently impounds the
persistence characteristics of the components of RNOAt, then we should find no
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Figure 1 Biased market prices and analysts’ earnings forecasts. RETt+1 represents the abnormal
return on the firm’s common stock, accumulated from the beginning of the fifth month of fiscal year
t + 1 (i.e. shortly after the release of the firm’s year t 10-K) and ending immediately after the firm’s
announcement of its earnings for year t + 1. FEt+1,a and FEt+1,b, respectively, represent the
difference between year t + 1 actual earnings (At+1) and the analyst’s forecast of those earnings
either just before (Ft+1,a) or just after (Ft+1,b) the beginning of the return accumulation period. PB
represents the firm’s stock price at the beginning of the return accumulation period, and EAk
represents the announcement of earnings for year k (k = t or t + 1). When we evaluate the influence
of biased analyst forecasts on market prices, we use the most recent analyst forecast before the
beginning of the return accumulation period to measure FEt+1,a. When we evaluate the influence of
market prices on the bias in analysts’ forecasts, we use the first analyst forecast after the beginning
of the return accumulation period to measure FEt+1,b. If Ft+1,a (PB) is unbiased, then we should not
find a relation between FEt+1,a (RETt+1) and the components of RNOAt.
© 2015 AFAANZ
208 D. Hollie et al./Accounting and Finance 57 (2017) 199–237
relation between those components and abnormal stock returns computed with
referencetoPB,wherePB is thefirm’sstockpriceshortlyafter thefirm’spublication
of its year t 10-K containing information about the detailed components of
RNOAt, including information investors might use to assess persistence.
Equation (11) below models abnormal returns as a function of the
unexpected portion of RNOAt+1, where returns are accumulated over a
window beginning with PB and ending the day after the announcement of the
firm’s year t + 1 earnings.
RETtþ1 ¼ cþ b½RNOAtþ1  ða=0 þ
Xn
i¼1
a=i CitÞ þ utþ1; ð11Þ
where a=i represents the market’s perception of the persistence of earnings
component Ci. Substituting the right-hand side of (10) for RNOAt+1 in (11)
and rearranging terms:
RETtþ1 ¼ cþ b½ða0  a=0Þ þ
Xn
i¼1
ðai  a=i ÞCit þ etþ1 þ utþ1: ð12Þ
Substituting k0 for bða0  a=0Þ and ki for bðai  a=i Þ,
RETtþ1 ¼ cþ k0 þ
Xn
i¼1
kiCit þ betþ1 þ utþ1 ð13Þ
where b represents the earnings response coefficient, and RETt+1 = firm i’s
raw returns, accumulated from the fifth month following the end of fiscal year t
through the fourth month following the end of fiscal year t + 1 minus the
similarly accumulated mean return of all firms in the same size decile as firm i
(with size deciles formed as of the end of fiscal year t). If the market efficiently
impounds the persistence characteristics of RNOAt and its various components,
then a0 = a
=
0, ai = a
=
i , and the lambda coefficients in (13) are all zero. If the
market overweights (underweights) the persistence of component i, then ki < 0
(ki > 0).
10
Next, we use model (14) below to assess the effect, if any, of financial
analysts’ earnings forecasts on any inefficiency in market prices detected in (13)
above. If, as described in Figure 1, Ft+1,a systematically either overweights or
underweights the persistence of components of RNOAt, then we should observe
a relation between FEt+1,a and RNOAt. Furthermore, if market prices rely on
analysts to form annual earnings expectations (Brown et al., 1985), then we
10 Rather than using the framework developed by Mishkin (1983), we use a conventional
OLS model to test the rational expectations hypotheses. Kraft et al. (2007) show that
OLS and the Mishkin test generate identical inferences in accounting settings when
samples are large. The difference between actual and implied market persistence
estimates is derived in model (13) by dividing each component variable coefficient by the
residual variable coefficient.
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expect to find a relation between FEt+1 and RETt+1. Thus, adding FEt+1 to
model (13) controls for the impact of any bias in analysts’ response to the
persistence characteristics of components of RNOAt on the market’s response
to those persistence characteristics.
RETtþ1 ¼ cþ g0 þ
Xn
i¼1
giCit þ betþ1 þ uFEtþ1;a þ utþ1; ð14Þ
where FEt+1,a = (At+1  Ft+1,a)/PB,t+1, At+1 is the firm’s actual earnings
(per I/B/E/S) announced at time EAt+1 in Figure 1, Ft+1,a is the most recent
analyst forecast issued prior to the beginning of the return accumulation period
(and after the announcement of year t earnings), and PB,t+1 is the stock price at
the beginning of the return accumulation period.11 The ƞi coefficients in (14)
represent the difference between actual persistence and market persistence
perceptions without the influence of analysts’ forecasts on market prices. If (14)
produces ƞi estimates that are closer to (further from) zero than the
corresponding ki coefficients in (13), then analyst forecasting behaviour
exacerbates (attenuates) the bias in the market’s perception of the persistence
of component i of RNOAt.
In other words, model (14) includes a forecast error variable that
removes the variability in RETt+1 due to the influence of any biased
forecast response to RNOAt and its components. If analyst forecasting
behaviour attenuates market overweighting (underweighting) of the
persistence characteristics of RNOAt and its components, then we expect
the underweighting/overweighting coefficients to become increasingly
negative (positive) and significant due to the inclusion of control variable
FEt+1,a.
Including FEt+1,a in the returns model above removes the impact (if any) of
any biased analyst response to the persistence characteristics of RNOAt and its
components on the estimated market underweighting/overweighting coeffi-
cients on RNOAt and its components. We are then left with underweighting/
overweighting coefficients reflecting the bias, if any, in how the market would
have responded to RNOAt and its components without the influence of any
analyst forecasting bias. Comparing the underweighting/overweighting coeffi-
cients in model (13) to the underweighting/overweighting coefficients in model
(14) provides insight into the portion of the bias in the stock price response to
11 We follow the convention in prior literature that uses analyst-defined earnings to
measure analyst forecast errors (Ramnath et al., 2005), whereas, as in Dechow et al.
(2008), we use GAAP-defined earnings to evaluate the persistence of earnings
components.
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RNOAt and its components due to, or mitigated by, bias in analysts’
forecasting response to the same information.12
As described in Shane and Brous (2001), if analyst forecasting behaviour
completely drives market inefficiency with respect to information about future
earnings, then adding the forecast error variable to the returns regressions
should make the coefficients on the information variables go to zero. On the
other hand, if the market would have underweighted/overweighted RNOAt and
its components without the influence of any bias in analysts’ forecasts, then the
underweighting (overweighting) coefficients should be significantly positive
(negative) in model (14).
4.3. Financial analyst efficiency
Next, we assess whether any bias in the market’s response to RNOAt and its
components influences any bias in analysts’ response to the same information.
Model (15) below evaluates analyst one-year-ahead forecasting efficiency
before controlling for effects of investor behaviour.
FEtþ1;b ¼ cþ a0 þ
Xn
i¼1
aiCit þ betþ1 þ utþ1; ð15Þ
where FEt+1,b = (At+1 – Ft+1,b)/PB,t+1, and Ft+1,b is the first analyst forecast
of year t + 1 earnings issued during the fifth month of fiscal year t + 1, that is
after PB and the beginning of the return accumulation period.
If analysts issue efficient forecasts following firms’ release of their financial
statements containing cash and accrual components of earnings, then the
information in those financial statements should not predict analysts’ forecast
errors (FEt+1,b), and the coefficients on the earnings variables, Cit, should equal
zero. The intercept term captures analysts’ general optimism/pessimism. For
example, a significantly negative intercept, c < 0 in model (15), indicates
systematically optimistic Ft+1,b.
To remove any influence of biased stock price response to RNOAt and its
components, model (16) adds year t + 1 abnormal returns accumulated over
12 Our technique for assessing market efficiency with and without the influence of biases
in analysts’ earnings forecasts relies on the following assumptions: (i) the relation
between analyst error in forecasting year t + 1 earnings and year t earnings components
effectively proxies for analyst forecasting bias; (ii) the relation between the year t + 1
returns variable and year t earnings components effectively proxies for investor
forecasting bias; (iii) the relation between analyst error in forecasting year t + 1 earnings
and the year t + 1 returns variable effectively proxies for the influence of analyst
forecasts on investor forecasts; and (iv) adding the year t + 1 analyst forecast error to a
regression of the year t + 1 returns variable on year t earnings components effectively
controls for the influence of analyst forecasting bias on investor forecasting bias.
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the period from the beginning of the fifth month of fiscal year t + 1 through the
day following EAt+1.
13
FEtþ1;b ¼ cþ g0 þ
Xn
i¼1
giCit þ betþ1 þ kRETtþ1 þ utþ1: ð16Þ
Including RETt+1 in model (16) removes any impact of bias in the price
reaction to the persistence characteristics of RNOAt and its components. If
analyst forecasting behaviour simply mimics the behaviour of the marginal
investor, then adding RETt+1 to the FEt+1,b regressions should make the
underweighting/overweighting coefficients on RNOAt and its components go to
zero. On the other hand, if, for example, investor overweighting attenuates
analyst underweighting of the persistence of RNOAt and its components, then
the coefficients in model (16) should become significantly positive and more so
than in model (15).
4. Sample
As we rely on I/B/E/S to measure the forecast error (FEt+1,k) variable, our
sample represents larger firms and a more recent time period relative to the
sample and time periods in Sloan (1996) and subsequent studies of market
efficiency with respect to cash and accrual earnings components. Our time
period spans the years 1988–2011.
To estimate the variables in our models, we obtain the following: financial
statement data from Compustat; returns data from CRSP; and earnings
forecasts, actual earnings, and stock prices from I/B/E/S. To increase the power
of our tests, we rely on two samples. The first sample eliminates observations
without the data needed to measure Ft+1,a, and the second sample eliminates
observations without the data needed to measure Ft+1,b. Ft+1,a is the most
recent forecast during the period between the announcement of year t earnings
and the first day of the fifth month of fiscal year t + 1. Ft+1,b is the first forecast
of year t + 1 earnings published during the fifth month of fiscal year t + 1. As
described above, we need Ft+1,a (Ft+1,b) to examine the effect of analyst
forecasting (market response) bias on biased market (analyst) perception of the
persistence characteristics of RNOAt components. Table 1 describes the
selection of these two samples. Sample 1 is larger than Sample 2, because we
13 As described by Dechow et al. (2008), research evaluating delayed market response to
year t 10-K information typically relies on returns accumulated from the beginning of
the fifth month of the fiscal year t + 1, as ‘firms generally file Form 10-Ks within
four months after the end of the fiscal year (p. 547)’. As a sensitivity check, we begin the
return accumulation period on the day following the 10-K filing date and obtain
qualitatively similar results with no change in inferences drawn throughout the study.
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find more forecasts of year t + 1 earnings published by I/B/E/S during the
period between the announcement of year t earnings and the first day of the
fifth month of fiscal year t + 1 than during the course of the fifth month of
fiscal year t + 1.
Table 1
Sample selection
Sample 1 Sample 2
All Compustat US firm-
years from 1988 to 2011
185,751 185,751
Exclude financial firms (SIC
codes 6000–6999)
35,882 35,882
Exclude firm-years missing
data needed to compute
cash-flow and accrual
earnings component
variables
48,195 48,195
Exclude firm-years where
NOA,< 0
8,442 8,442
Subtotal 93,232 93,232
Exclude firm-years without
matching CRSP data needed
to compute RET
15,823 15,823
Subtotal 77,409 77,409
Exclude firm-years without
matching I/B/E/S data
needed to compute FEt,+ 1,k
35,484 46,356
Number of firm-years before
eliminating outliers
41,925 31,053
Exclude observations where the absolute
value of any of the following
variables is > 1: FEt + 1,
FCFt, ACCt, DCASHt,
DIST_EQt, DIST_Dt, SGt,
DEFFt
4,166 3,169
Number of firm-years in the
final sample
37,759 27,884
We use Sample 1 to evaluate analyst influence on biased market response to the persistence
characteristics of operating income components, and we use Sample 2 to evaluate market
influence on biased analyst response to the persistence characteristics of operating income
components. Sample 1 requires at least one year t + 1 earnings forecast published by I/B/E/S
during the period between the year t earnings announcement and the first day of the fifth
month of fiscal year t + 1 (the beginning of the return accumulation period). Figure 1 refers
to this forecast as Ft+1,a. Sample 2 requires at least one year t + 1 earnings forecast
published by I/B/E/S during the fifth month of fiscal year t + 1. Figure 1 refers to this
forecast as Ft+1,b.
© 2015 AFAANZ
D. Hollie et al./Accounting and Finance 57 (2017) 199–237 213
Table 1 shows that the initial sample contains 185 751 firm-year observations
on Compustat’s Annual Industrial, Research, and Full Coverage files spanning
the years 1988–2011. We exclude firms in the financial services industry (35,882
firm-years with SIC codes in the range 6000–6999). We omit 48,195 observa-
tions without Compustat data needed to compute our cash-flow and accrual
earnings component variables. We exclude 8,442 observations with net
operating assets less than zero. We lose 15,823 observations missing the CRSP
data needed to compute our returns variable. In Sample 1 (Sample 2), we lose
another 35,484 (46,356) firm-year observations without I/B/E/S data needed to
compute the forecast error variable, FEt+1,a (FEt+1,b). Finally, Sample 1
(Sample 2) excludes 4,166 (3,169) outlier observations, with an earnings
component or analyst forecast error variable greater than 1 or less than 1.
The final sample size consists of 37,759 (27,884) firm-years spanning 1988–2011
for Sample 1 (Sample 2).
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics, including correlations between vari-
ables used in the study. Panel A describes Sample 1 and Panel B describes
Sample 2. The two samples are quite similar, so we only discuss the Sample 1
descriptive statistics. Panel A shows that, as expected, the centre of the
distribution of the abnormal returns variable is near zero (mean RET = 0.006),
and its interquartile range is 38%, so there is substantial variation to be
explained. The forecast error variable is deflated by the stock price reported in
the most recent I/B/E/S report prior to the return accumulation period.14
Analysts provide slightly optimistic current-year forecasts for our sample firms
(mean FEt+1,a < 0).
RNOAt is naturally deflated by beginning of year net operating assets, and
the accrual and free cash-flow components of net operating income are
similarly deflated. Panel A shows that, on average, 9% (91%) of the 10.9%
mean return on net operating assets comes from the free cash-flow (accruals)
component of net operating income. Specifically, the mean FCFt = 0.8% and
the mean ACCt = 10.1%; however, the median FCFt is 4.6% and the median
ACCt is 5.7%. FCFt (ACCt) appears to be skewed towards the left (right) side
of the distribution. Sales growth (mean = 10.9%), rather than asset efficiency,
14 As the stock price deflator could be contaminated by any market inefficiency with
respect to the year t earnings variables that are the subject of our evaluation of the
relations between analyst and market efficiency, we conduct a sensitivity analysis using
the following alternative deflators: book value of equity as of the end of fiscal year t, net
operating assets as of the end of year t, absolute actual earnings per I/B/E/S, and,
following Ahmed et al. (2006), average year t total assets. The results and inferences are
entirely robust to these alternative deflators.
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fuelled the, on average, positive accruals during our sample period
(mean = 10.1%).
Table 3 provides pairwise Pearson and Spearman correlations among the
variables used in this study. Panel A applies to Sample 1 and Panel B applies to
Sample 2. Again, the statistics are similar for the two samples, so we will only
discuss Panel A. The significant positive contemporaneous correlation between
RETt+1 and FEt+1 (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.24, with p < 0.0001)
reflects strong common elements between the behaviour of analysts and
investors. However, the correlation is far from perfect, which creates tension
and makes it an empirical question as to whether bias in the Ft+1,a creates bias
in market price PB and whether PB creates bias in Ft+1,b.
On a univariate basis, consistent with Sloan (1996), it appears that investors
overweight accruals persistence and underweight free cash-flow persistence,
Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Variable 25th Pctl Mean Median 75th Pctl SD
Panel A: Univariate statistics for sample 1
RETt + 1 0.232 0.006 0.043 0.150 0.469
FEt + 1,a 0.017 0.016 0.002 0.004 0.074
At + 1/PB,t + 1 0.030 0.035 0.054 0.075 0.133
Ft + 1,a/PB,t + 1 0.040 0.050 0.060 0.079 0.113
SGt 0.005 0.109 0.086 0.192 0.202
DEFFt 0.097 0.004 0.018 0.115 0.225
DCASHt 0.027 0.018 0.004 0.061 0.204
DIST_EQt 0.037 0.000 0.006 0.056 0.188
DIST_Dt 0.054 0.011 0.003 0.062 0.180
FCFt 0.081 0.008 0.046 0.144 0.293
ACCt 0.038 0.101 0.057 0.198 0.279
RNOAt 0.054 0.109 0.107 0.184 0.246
Panel B: Univariate statistics for sample 2
RETt + 1 0.229 0.006 0.042 0.151 0.465
FEt + 1,b 0.016 0.015 0.002 0.004 0.075
At + 1/PB,t + 1 0.029 0.032 0.053 0.073 0.136
Ft + 1,b/PB,t + 1 0.039 0.047 0.059 0.078 0.119
SGt 0.007 0.114 0.088 0.198 0.205
DEFFt 0.096 0.002 0.018 0.116 0.225
DCASHt 0.026 0.019 0.004 0.059 0.200
DIST_EQt 0.038 0.002 0.006 0.055 0.187
DIST_Dt 0.057 0.012 0.004 0.063 0.184
FCFt 0.081 0.004 0.045 0.141 0.294
ACCt 0.035 0.104 0.059 0.200 0.280
RNOAt 0.053 0.109 0.107 0.182 0.240
See the Appendix for variable definitions.
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respectively, as we find a significant negative correlation between ACCt and
RETt+1 and a significant positive correlation between FCFt and RETt+1.
Investors appear to overweight both components of accruals persistence, as we
find significant negative correlation between SGt and RETt+1 and between
DEFFt and RETt+1. Consistent with Dechow et al. (2008), the significant
positive correlation between returns and distributions to both stockholders and
debtholders drives the significant positive correlation between free cash flow
and next year’s returns. Finally, the significant negative Pearson correlation
coefficient relating DCASHt to RETt+1 supports Dechow et al.’s inference that
investors overweight the change in cash component of free cash flow, although
the Spearman correlation between DCASHt and RETt+1 is significantly
positive.
Turning to analyst forecasting behaviour, consistent with Bradshaw et al.
(2001), the univariate correlations in Table 3 Panel B suggest that analysts
overweight the persistence of accruals (significant negative correlation between
ACCt and FEt+1).
15 Also, it appears that analysts underweight free cash-flow
persistence (significant positive correlation between FCFt and FEt+1). Univar-
iate statistics suggest that analyst underweighting of free cash-flow persistence
permeates all three free cash-flow components: DCASHt, DIST_Dt and
DIST_EQt.
The univariate correlation matrix suggests that investors and analysts
overweight the efficiency change component of accruals persistence. Table 3
reports a significant negative correlation between DEFFt and FEt+1, and a
significant negative correlation between DEFFt and RETt+1. The highly
significant negative correlation between FCFt and ACCt (Pearson = 0.63 and
Spearman = 0.64) means a multivariate test is required to identify each
variable’s unique relation with future returns (RETt+1) and future forecast
errors (FEt+1).
16 Thus, conclusions, drawn from univariate statistics in
Table 3, about analyst/market overweighting/underweighting of the persistence
of free cash-flow and accrual earnings components are premature. It is not clear
at this stage whether analyst behaviour attenuates or exacerbates biased market
perception of the persistence characteristics of components of operating
income. Nor is it clear at this stage whether market price behaviour attenuates
or exacerbates biased analyst perception of the persistence characteristics of
components of operating income. Our multivariate tests that follow are
designed to more rigorously address these questions.
15 As explained by Drake and Myers (2011), many subsequent studies interpret the
Bradshaw et al. (2001) evidence to mean that analysts overweight the persistence
characteristics of accruals (Thomas and Zhang, 2002; Collins et al., 2003; Elgers et al.,
2003; Hanlon, 2005; Mashruwala et al., 2006).
16 See Ahmed et al. (2006) and Drake and Myers (2011) for similar attention to this
issue.
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5.2. Earnings persistence
Table 4 shows that the cash and accrual earnings components, derived from
our sample, exhibit persistence characteristics consistent with prior literature.
Again, Panel A (Panel B) describes the results for Sample 1 (Sample 2), and as
the results are similar, we only discuss Panel A. As described by the regression
in Panel A, return on net operating assets persists strongly from one year to the
next. The regression of RNOAt+1 on RNOAt has a highly significant slope
coefficient of 0.63, and the adjusted R2 statistic indicates that RNOAt explains
32 percent of the variation in RNOAt+1. Panel A shows that coefficients
relating cash and accrual earnings to next year earnings are 0.69 and 0.56,
respectively, and while both coefficients are significantly greater than zero, they
are also significantly different from each other (p < 0.0001).17 Consistent with
Dechow (1994), Sloan (1996) and Barth et al. (2001), cash flows are
significantly more persistent than accruals.
Table 4 provides evidence that every component of cash and accrual
earnings is highly persistent. Each disaggregated cash and accrual earnings
component is significantly related to RNOAt+1 with the expected sign. The
persistence parameters range from a low of 0.48 on the efficiency change
component of accruals to a high of 0.71 on the retained cash component of
free cash flow. Untabulated F-tests show that each coefficient estimate is
significantly different from each other, at the one percent level. Thus,
disaggregating earnings into components that have different persistence
characteristics provides useful information for purposes of forecasting
earnings and valuing securities.
5.3. Market efficiency
Table 5 describes the behaviour of stock returns following publication of
financial statements with enough information to disaggregate earnings into
the accrual and cash components described in Table 4 and model (10). In
Panel A, estimates of model (14) coefficients indicate that, controlling for the
bias in analysts’ forecasts, the market’s overweighting coefficient equals
0.13 (t-statistic = 2.63) with reference to net operating income as a
whole. Removing the control variable, the ostensible market overweighting
coefficient is statistically insignificant at 0.08 (t-statistic = 1.61), and the
p-value associated with the 37 percent decline in absolute value from 0.13
to 0.08 is <0.01. Apparently, with reference to the persistence of RNOAt,
underweighting bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts attenuates the overweigh-
ting in stock market prices to the point where it registers as statistically
insignificant.
17 All p-values refer to two-tailed significance levels.
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As shown in Panel B, with FEt+1 in the model, the coefficient relating ACCt
to RETt+1 equals 0.17 and is significantly less than zero (t-statistic = 3.21).
Removing FEt+1 from the model reduces the estimated market overweighting
coefficient by 23% (from 0.17 to 0.13). This decline in market overweighting
associated with allowing the influence of biased analyst forecasts is statistically
significant (p < 0.01). Apparently, analyst inefficiency with respect to the
persistence of accrual earnings significantly attenuates, but does not render
insignificant, the market overweighting.
Panel B shows that with FEa,t+1 in the model, the coefficient relating FCFt to
RETt+1 equals 0.10 (t-statistic = 2.02). Removing FEt+1 from the model
reduces the estimated market overweighting coefficient by 57% (from 0.10 to
Table 4
Persistence of components of cash and accrual earnings
RNOAtþ1 ¼ a0 þ
Pn
i¼1
aiCit þ etþ1 (10)
Variable Coeff. (t-stat.) Coeff. (t-stat.) Coeff. (t-stat.) Coeff. (t-stat.)
Panel A: Sample 1 (37,759 observations spanning the years 1988–2011)
Intercept 0.033 (5.55) 0.038 (6.51) 0.031 (5.13) 0.039 (6.50)
RNOA 0.627 (41.80)
FCF 0.686 (48.26) 0.677 (49.00)
ACC 0.556 (29.16) 0.535 (26.79)
ΔCASH 0.713 (43.95)
DIST_EQ 0.679 (38.84)
DIST_D 0.619 (32.36)
SG 0.639 (29.89)
DEFF 0.481 (21.15)
SGt * DEFF 0.643 (17.13)
Adj. R2 0.317 0.335 0.345 0.340
Panel B: Sample 2 (27,884 observations spanning the years 1988–2011)
Intercept 0.037 (6.38) 0.042 (7.28) 0.034 (5.94) 0.043 (7.15)
RNOA 0.608 (45.17)
FCF 0.664 (49.58) 0.656 (50.21)
ACC 0.539 (30.63) 0.519 (27.63)
ΔCASH 0.691 (40.90)
DIST_EQ 0.653 (41.47)
DIST_D 0.603 (30.31)
SG 0.620 (31.75)
DEFF 0.457 (21.90)
SGt * DEFF 0.678 (17.87)
Adj. R2 0.296 0.314 0.325 0.319
The Fama–MacBeth procedure is employed to run cross-sectional regressions (associated t-
statistics in parentheses). See the Appendix for variable definitions.
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0.04). This decline in market overweighting associated with allowing the
influence of biased analyst forecasts is statistically significant (p < 0.01).
Apparently, analysts’ underweighting bias with respect to the persistence of free
cash flow significantly attenuates the market’s tendency towards overweighting.18
A picture of analyst underweighting and investor overweighting of the
persistence of annual earnings and its components is beginning to emerge.
Without controlling for analyst underweighting, the strong positive relation
between RETt+1 and FEt+1 obscures the influence of analyst forecasting bias
on stock price overweighting of the persistence of RNOAt and its components.
Controlling for the strong positive relation between investor and analyst
behaviour, we find evidence of general market overweighting of both cash and
accrual earnings components. The market overweighting of cash earnings
persistence that would occur without the influence of the bias in analysts’
forecasts is a new result, inconsistent with inferences drawn from Sloan (1996)
and the many studies that followed.
Panel C of Table 5 replicates the Richardson et al. (2001) analysis of the
relation of cash flow and disaggregated accrual earnings components with
following year returns. Before controlling for analyst behaviour, both accrual
components of earnings are negatively related to future returns (indicating
overweighting). Panel C shows that controlling for the mitigating influence of
analysts’ forecasts, the coefficients relating the sales growth and change in
efficiency components of year t accrual earnings to year t + 1 returns are 0.16
and0.18with t-statistics of3.07 and3.61, respectively.OmittingFEt+1 from
the model shows that the mitigating influence of biased analyst forecasts reduces
market overweighting by a statistically significant 31 and 13 percent, respec-
tively. Thus, controlling for analyst forecasting behaviour, estimation of model
(14) in Panel C reveals generalised market overweighting of free cash-flow
persistence and both components of accruals persistence. Apparently, analyst
underweighting attenuates investors’ tendency to overweight and leaves the
marketwith a relatively efficient pricewith respect to persistence characteristics of
FCFt, and with a significantly reduced overweighting of the persistence of sales
growth and asset efficiency components of accrual earnings. We will explore the
efficiency of the analyst reaction more directly in Table 6, but the evidence in
Table 5 suggests that analysts underweight the free cash flow, sales growth and
asset efficiency components of net operating income persistence.
Finally, Panel D of Table 5 shows that, without controlling for analyst
forecasting behaviour, estimates of coefficients in model (13) show no evidence
of market inefficiency with respect to the components of free cash flow.
However, controlling for FEt+1 in model (14) reveals the mitigating influence
of biased analyst forecasts on what otherwise would appear as market
18 Similarly, Louis et al. (2013) find that analysts’ forecasts following management
forecasts appear to adjust for the lack of persistence in abnormal accruals. This analyst
forecasting behaviour appears to attenuate the abnormal accrual anomaly.
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overweighting of the retained cash and distribution to debtholder components
of cash earnings persistence. The overweighting coefficients on all three
components of free cash flow decline significantly in absolute value when we
remove FEt+1 from the model, thus allowing the mitigating influence of analyst
forecasting behaviour on the tendency of the market to overweight the
persistence characteristics of free cash flow and its components. In particular,
the coefficients on ΔCASH, DIST_EQ, and DIST_D decline by statistically
significant amounts equal to 48, 69, and 63 percent, respectively. The overall
findings from Table 5 show that the market overweights both accrual and cash
earnings persistence, after controlling for analyst behaviour. Biased analysts’
earnings forecasts, following the release of year t financial reports, attenuate
market overweighting of both cash and accrual components of net operating
income persistence.
We interpret the findings in Table 5 as follows. Left to their own devices,
individual investors tend to overweight the persistence of annual earnings
information and its free cash-flow and accrual components. However, the
market of investors apparently pays attention to analysts’ interpretation of
accounting information (Gleason and Lee, 2003; So, 2013). Therefore, analysts’
underweighting of the persistence of earnings and its components attenuates
the market overweighting. We suspect that analysts’ forecasts tend to
underweight accounting information due to analysts’ economic incentives
(Raedy et al., 2006), whereas individual investors tend to overweight account-
ing information for yet to be determined psychological or economic reasons.
5.4. Financial analysts’ forecast efficiency
Table 6 describes the efficiency of analysts’ year t + 1 earnings forecasts after
the beginning of the 12 month accumulation period, with respect to year t
earnings information. We infer analyst underweighting/overweighting with
reference to the expectations adjustment implied by the year t + 1 annual
earnings announcement that occurs one trading day before the end of the return
accumulation period. If analysts’ forecasts efficiently impound the information in
earnings and its components, then slope coefficients should not differ from zero in
regressions of our expectations adjustment variable, FEt+1, on year t earnings
variables. Instead, Table 6 Panels A and B report significantly positive
coefficients on RNOAt and both FCFt and ACCt.
From Table 5, we infer that investors overweight information about the
persistence of earnings and its components, and from Table 3, we infer that
there is a strong positive univariate relation between analyst errors in
forecasting year t + 1 earnings and returns during the return accumulation
period. With and without controls for investor overweighting, the signif-
icantly positive coefficients on RNOAt (Panel A) and on both FCFt and
ACCt (Panel B) suggest that analysts underweight the persistence of both
free cash-flow and accrual components of earnings. This result is inconsis-
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tent with Drake and Myers (2011) which concludes that, like investors,
analysts overweight the persistence of accruals.
Our study differs from Drake and Myers (2011) (hereafter DM) in several
important ways. First, our sample period covers the years 1988 through 2011,
whereas the DM sample covers the years from 1993 through 2008. Second, DM
compute annual forecast errors with reference to forecastsmade between 30 days
and one year prior to the fiscal year-end date, whereas we rely on forecasts made
around the time of the beginning of our return accumulation period, that is
four months after the end of fiscal year t (Figure 1). Third, DM evaluate analyst
forecasting efficiency with respect to working capital accruals and operating cash
flows, whereas we followDRS and evaluate forecasting efficiency with respect to
total accruals and free cash flow. Fourth, DM’s tests are at the analyst level, with
approximately 15 observations per analyst-specific regression, whereas our tests
are conducted across firms within years, and we have approximately 1500
observations per annual regression. Fifth, DM deflate their earnings component
variables by equity market value, whereas we deflate by net operating assets to
disaggregate our measure of operating earnings (return on net operating assets)
into its component parts.Finally,DMuse theprior year’s analyst forecast error as
a control variable, whereas our theoretically based control variable comes from
the residual of the model that predicts RNOA during the prior year. We follow
DRS and derive all of our earnings variables from algebraic disaggregation of
RNOA, whereas DM’s earnings components, also based on prior literature, are
more ad hoc.19,20
Turning to analyst year t + 1 forecasting efficiency with respect to the
information in detailed components of accrual earnings, Panels C and D show
that the analyst underweighting coefficient on all components of cash and accrual
earnings remains statistically significant andbarelymoveswith the removal of the
influence of investor overweighting of the same earnings information. The most
movement occurs in estimated analyst underweighting of the efficiency change
component of accrual earnings. Allowing for the influence of investor over-
weighting of that component of accrual earnings is associated with a statistically
significant 20% decline in the analyst underweighting coefficient from 0.020 to
0.015. We find no evidence of investor overweighting of the persistence of other
components of cash and accrual earnings influencing analyst underweighting, as
19 Our inference that analysts underweight the persistence of accrual earnings is also
inconsistent with Bradshaw et al. (2001), but we are able to replicate the Bradshaw et al.
(2001) results by omitting the free cash-flow component of earnings from the model.
Thus, like Ahmed et al. (2006) and Drake and Myers (2011), we conclude that Bradshaw
et al. inferences suffer from an omitted variable problem.
20 We are aware of only one other study of analyst forecasting efficiency with respect to
the persistence of cash earnings. In that study, unlike DM but like our study, Yu (2007)
finds that analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts underweight the implications of the prior
year’s cash earnings.
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declines in analyst underweighting are statistically insignificant with respect to all
other components of cash and accrual earnings. The change in efficiency
component of year t accrual earnings is the only place where we observe a
significant mitigating effect of market overweighting on analyst underweighting
of operating earnings and the details of its cash and accrual components.21
Overall, it appears that analysts ignore (or unravel) the overweighting bias in
stock prices when making their year t + 1 forecasting decisions following the
release of year t financial statements. Even without controlling for the
overweighting bias in stock prices, the evidence in Table 6 suggests that
analysts underweight net operating income and all of its free cash-flow and
accrual components. Panels A and B show statistically significant underweigh-
ting of the persistence of net operating income (Panel A) and its two major
components: free cash flow and accruals (Panel B). Panel C shows that analyst
underweighting of the sales growth component of earnings drives the
underweighting of accruals persistence. Table 4 shows that the persistence of
DEFFt increases with sales growth, and the interaction term in Table 6 Panel
C suggests that analyst underweighting of the one-year-ahead persistence of
DEFFt increases with firms’ growth prospects. Apparently, analysts react
more conservatively to the future earnings implications of increased investment
in net operating assets by rapidly growing firms.
Table 6 Panel D reports results indicating that analysts’ year t + 1 forecasts
strongly underweight information in the retained cash and distributions to both
debt and stockholder components of free cash-flow persistence. Overall, our
results are generally consistent with investor overweighting and analyst under-
weighting of the persistence of earnings and its free cash-flow and accrual
components. Furthermore, we find significant evidence of analysts’ biased
forecasts mitigating investor overweighting, but very little evidence consistent
with biased stock prices mitigating analyst underweighting.22
21 If, instead of decomposing total accruals into efficiency change and sales growth
components, we follow Ahmed et al. (2006) and decompose total accruals into working
capital and long-term components, we find that, without controls for investor
overweighting, analysts’ underweight the persistence of long-term accruals but not
working capital accruals. After controlling for investor overweighting, we find that
analysts underweight persistence of both working capital and long-term accruals.
Details of these untabulated results are available from the authors upon request.
22 We also conduct all tests over two subperiods: pre-Reg FD (1988–1999) and post-
Global Settlement (2004–2011). The results for the pre-Reg FD period are qualitatively
similar to the results reported in the tables. The results for the post-Global Settlement
period are similar to the pre-Reg FD results except that we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the market and analysts with and without the influence of each other respond
efficiently to accrual earnings. These results are consistent with Green et al. (2011) who
find no evidence of an accrual anomaly during the years following the Global
Settlement.
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Our empirical results, suggesting that analysts generally underweight
earnings persistence, are consistent with the theory of analyst underweighting
developed in Raedy et al. (2006). Raedy et al. (2006) develop a mathematical
model predicting generalised analyst underweighting, given an asymmetric loss
function that punishes analysts more severely for reversing the direction of their
earnings forecasts in the light of new information. This view suggests that
analysts are sophisticated users of financial accounting information and, as
such, understand the persistence properties of various earnings components.
However, economic incentives lead analysts to underweight, and the under-
weighting is apparent across all cash and accrual components of earnings. On
the other hand, the market includes unsophisticated investors, who apparently
overweight the persistence of accrual and cash-flow components of earnings,
and market frictions prevent sophisticated arbitragers from fully exploiting
these inefficiencies.
6. Summary and conclusions
This study examines biases in stock prices and financial analysts’ earnings
forecasts with reference to persistence characteristics of net operating income
and its free cash-flow and accrual components. These biases take the form of
systematic overweighting or underweighting. We find that stock prices have a
general tendency to overweight the persistence of net operating income and its
components, whereas financial analysts have a tendency to underweight the
same information. Analysts’ forecasting bias appears to attenuate what
otherwise would appear as more pronounced stock price overweighting. On
the other hand, we find little evidence that the bias in stock prices attenuates
analyst underweighting.
One explanation for our results is that the strong positive relation between
returns on equity securities and revisions in analysts’ expectations about firms’
future earnings stems from the following: (i) analysts directly accessing
information underlying stock price changes (as opposed to indirectly assim-
ilating the information through observation of price changes); and (ii) analysts
providing information directly to investors (as opposed to investors directly
accessing information underlying changes in analyst expectations). In this
manner, biases in analysts’ forecasts affect investor decisions and, to some
degree, find their way into stock prices, whereas biases in stock prices do not
travel back to analysts.
We derive earnings components from disaggregating free cash flows as in
Dechow et al. (2008) and from disaggregating accruals as in Richardson et al.
(2001, 2006). Both studies begin by disaggregating net operating income into
free cash-flow and accrual components. Dechow et al. (2008) further disag-
gregate free cash flow based on how the firm distributes (funds) a surplus
(deficit). These distribution and funding decisions are categorised as changes in
cash and net distributions to debtholders and stockholders with the sign of the
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amount in each category depending on whether the amount reflects a
distribution or funding decision. Richardson et al. (2001, 2006) disaggregate
accruals into those related to sales growth and those related to changes in
efficiency (asset turnover).
We find evidence of general analyst underweighting of the persistence of all
components of net operating income. Our evidence suggests that the analyst
underweighting bias attenuates investor overweighting, resulting in stock prices
that show significantly reduced evidence of inefficiency with respect to net
operating income as a whole, free cash flow as a whole, accrual earnings as a
whole, the detailed cash retention and distribution to investors components of
free cash flow, and the detailed sales growth and change in efficiency
components of accrual earnings. On the other hand, we find very little
evidence of the overweighting bias in stock prices influencing the underweigh-
ting bias in analysts’ forecasts.
Overall, we find that, left to their own devices, analysts’ earnings forecasts
underweight the persistence characteristics of annual earnings, and stock
prices would overweight, but biased analysts’ forecasts largely mitigate this
overweighting tendency. This study brings a new perspective to the literature
regarding the role of financial analysts in capital markets. Beginning with
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), many studies examine the role of financial
analysts in relation to anomalous stock market behaviour. However, these
studies invariably look to analysts for root causes of market inefficiency.
Instead, we find that analysts play a disciplining role that reins in the
tendency for investors and stock prices to overweight information about
future earnings. Raedy et al. (2006) provide a theoretical framework within
which to study economic incentives behind this disciplining role of financial
analysts. We leave further exploration of such economic incentives for future
research.
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Appendix
Variable definitions (firm i subscripts suppressed).
RETt+1 = the annual buy and hold size-adjusted return, calculated by
subtracting the value-weighted average return for all firms in the same size-
matched decile, where size is measured as market capitalisation at the
beginning of the return accumulation period. The return accumulation
period begins with the fifth month following the end of fiscal year t and ends
with the first trading day following the earnings announcement date of fiscal
year t + 1. Earnings announcement dates come from I/B/E/S.
FEt+1,a = the signed forecast error, calculated as (At+1  Ft+1,a)/PB.
FEt+1,b = the signed forecast error, calculated as (At+1  Ft+1,b)/PB.
At+1 = actual split-adjusted earnings for fiscal year t + 1, per I/B/E/S.
Ft+1,a = the most recent I/B/E/S individual split-adjusted analyst forecast
prior to the beginning of the return accumulation period but after the year t
earnings announcement date. When more than one forecast occurs on that
day, Ft+1,a is the median of those forecasts.
Ft+1,b = the first split-adjusted forecast of t + 1 earnings dated in the fifth
month of fiscal year t + 1. When more than one forecast occurs on that
day, Ft+1,b is the median of all forecasts occurring on that day.
PB = the split-adjusted price taken from the same I/B/E/S report month
containing Ft+1,k.
NOAt = total operating assets  total operating liabilities for fiscal year t,
where cash and investments are defined as financial assets. Equivalently,
NOAt ¼ DEBTt þ CSEt  CASHt:
D. Hollie et al./Accounting and Finance 57 (2017) 199–237 235
© 2015 AFAANZ
Compustat variables used to measure NOAt (quotations come from
Compustat manuals):
 DEBTt = DLCt + DLTTt + PSTKt + MIBt
 CSEt = CEQt
 CASHt = CHEt + IVAOt
 CHE = cash and short-term investments
 IVAO = investments and advances (other). We assign a value of zero when
IVAO is missing from the Compustat database.
 DLC = debt in current liabilities. We assign a value of zero when DLC is
missing from the Compustat database.
 DLTT = total long-term debt, that is ‘The item represents debt obligations
due more than one year from the company’s balance sheet date’. We assign
a value of zero when DLTT is missing from the Compustat database.
 PSTK = total preferred stock, that is ‘This item represents the net number
of preferred shares at year-end multiplied by the par or stated value per
share as presented in the company’s Balance Sheet’.
 MIB = minority interest (Balance Sheet).
 CEQ = total common/ordinary equity.
ACCt = (NOAt  NOAt1)/NOAt–1 = the percentage change in non-cash
net operating assets, defined as total operating accruals for fiscal year t. See the
appendix in Richardson et al. (2006) for a proof of the decomposition of ACC
into sales growth and asset efficiency components.
ACCt ¼ SGt  EFFt  SGt  EFFt;
where
 SGt = sales growth, calculated as (SALEt/SALEt1)  1
 ΔEFFt = the deflated change in asset efficiency, calculated as
(EFFt  EFFt1)/EFFt, where EFFt = SALEt/NOAt.
RNOAt = NOIt/NOAt–1 = net operating income deflated by NOAt1.
et+1 = the portion of RNOAt+1 that is not explained by the persistence of
the components of RNOAt on the right-hand side of (10).
NOI ¼ Income available to common shareholdersþNet financing expense
¼ IBCOMþ ½ðXINT IDITÞ  ð1 BCG MTRINTÞ þDVPþMII;
where
 IBCOM = income before extraordinary items available to common
shareholders,
 XINT = total interest and related expense,
 IDIT = total interest and related income,
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 BCG_MTRINT = marginal tax rate after interest deductions or post-
financing MTR (Blouin et al., 2010),
 DVP = preferred dividends,
 MII = non-controlling interest (income statement).
Model (5) defines free cash flow (FCF) as:
FCF ¼ NOI DNOA ¼ DCASHþDIST EQþDIST D; ð5Þ
where ΔCASH represents cash retained from (or used in) operations,
DIST_EQ represents cash distributed to (or received from) stockholders, and
DIST_D represents cash distributed to (or received from) debtholders. Using
the Compustat variable definitions above, we measure each term in (5) directly
as follows:
 ΔCASH = (ΔCHE + ΔIVAO)/NOAt–1,
 DIST_EQ = (IBCOM  ΔCEQ)/NOAt1,
 DIST_D = [NFE  (ΔDLC + ΔDLTT + ΔPSTK + ΔMIB)]/NOAt1,
 NFE = (XINT  IDIT)*(1  BCG_MTRINT) + DVP + MII.
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